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Impact of Containerization

Impact of Containerization on Laws Concerning the
Maritime Shipping Industry
The maritime shipping industry is undergoing a revolution. The coming of age of containerized ocean shipping is having a profound effect in the United States and throughout the world. Millions of dollars are being spent on building huge container vessels
and installing new equipment in ocean ports in order to take advantage of this less
expensive and more efficient method of shipping. The largest part of shipping expense
stems from cargo handling, not the actual storage or transportation.' Since this is
exactly the expense the container reduces, it is indeed a welcome technological advancement. But as with most technological advancements, the container has also
created difficult problems. This article will concentrate on some of the most critical
legal and practical problems the container presents to persons affected by United States
international trade.
The container is a large rectangular box which rests on the chassis of a truck. The
length usually approximates thirty-five feet and the width seven feet, with the height
varying from four to eight feet. Usually, the container is sent empty to a shipper,
loaded at his factory or warehouse, driven to the dock, lifted off the chassis onto the
ship, sailed across the ocean, placed on a waiting truck chassis and delivered to the
buyer. Another method of use is for a shipper to send his freight to a container consolidation terminal where other shippers have sent their freight. There, freight bound
for the same destination is packed in a container, put on a truck and sent to the dock.
A third method is for the shipper to send his freight to the dock where dock workers
consolidate the container and ship it. These methods substantially lower transportation
costs by eliminating much of the labor previously needed. It is in the attempts to take
advantage of the potential lower costs that problems are encountered.
One of the main reasons for the development of containerization is the "door-todoor" concept in which a shipper is charged a single rate for the movement of his
freight from its point of origin in the United States to its final destination in a foreign
country, and vice versa. This intermodal movement involves both land and sea transportation charges above and beyond those previously affected by ocean carriers
generally, and shipping conferences 2 in particular. This procedure raises several questions: (1) Can conference members quote tariffs containing inland rates without
violating conference agreements? (2) Will the ocean carrier be able to quote a single
rate for point-to-point service or will he have to quote a series of component rates
regulated by different federal regulatory agencies, as is presently required? (3) Can
1. May, The Status of Federal Maritime Commission Shipping Regulation Under
Principles of InternationalLaw, 54 GEO. L.J. 794, 851 n.216 (1966).
2. Most international ocean shipping arrangements are established by conferences.
This entails carriers getting together and making arrangements to minimize or eliminate competition. Because of the many factors affecting international shipping, Section
15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964), exempted agreements approved by the FMC from antitrust provisions. For detailed discussion on conferences see Comment, Ocean Shipping Conferences and the Federal Maritime Commission, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1070 (1968).
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the United States regulate that part of the carriage which occurs within a foreign
country?
With respect to the first question, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) has
made a determination. 3 Container Marine Lines (CML) filed freight tariffs which
included provision for port-to-port service plus inland transportation in the United
Kingdom. 4 Many of the conferences of which CML is a member objected ,arguing that
to the extent CML is engaged in providing transportation between the United States
and foreign ports within the scope of conference agreements, it must charge the rates
set forth in conference tariffs. Container Marine Lines maintained that its tariffs were
not contradictory to those of the conference because they involved a service not covered
by conference agreements. The Commission held that so long as CML charged rates
for port-to-port service, it must charge the conference rates for that service. But as
conference agreements now stand, they cover only rates from port to port, and CML's
sea and land transportation service is outside the scope of these agreements. The Commission also said that conferences "cannot impede additional transportation service
becoming available to shippers, whether offered by an outsider or one of their own
members, especially when it involves an advancement in the state of the art." 5 The
solution to the conference's problem is that it will have to redraft all its agreements to
bring this activity within the scope of the conference. In this direction FMC said,
"[w]e do not mean to imply that the conferences could not obtain our approval to
extend their operations inland. In fact we assume that the conferences have the expertise to develop modem shipper services in the interest of improving transportation
systems.''6
The answer to the second question rests in proposed legislation. Under present law,
there is no express authority for a carrier to quote a single point-to-point rate which
includes inland transportation in the United States. The regulatory agencies will not
accept tariffs filed by carriers which incorporate rates for modes of transportation not
under their jurisdiction; absent express authorization, these agencies believe they have
no right to accept such tariffs. An export shipper has to contact carriers in each mode
of transportation to find out what his total cost will be. The present procedure of shipping goods is time consuming, costly and confusing. The estimated documentation cost
of a typical export shipment today is $163.00.7 This includes preparing a separate bill
of lading for each mode of transportation used. Confusion arises from the different
limits on liability and different methods of computing charges used by carriers. A
process is needed by which one carrier can offer a shipper a simple rate covering all
the elements of through transportation. This need has long been recognized, and while

3. Disposition of Container Marine Lines Through Intermodal Container Freight
Tariffs Nos. 1 and 2, FMC Nos. 10 and 11, No. 68-8 (FMC, April 23, 1968) [Hereinafter cited FMC Disposition No. 68-8].
4. By quoting such a tariff they were able to offer a cheaper rate for the ocean portion than the conference had established.
5. FMC Disposition No. 68-8, supra note 3, at 8.
6. Id. at 18.
7. Hearings on S. 3235 Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 90-78, at 57 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
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the regulatory agencies have tried to work out solutions, no real action was taken until
March 27, 1968, when at the request of the Department of Transportation, Senator
Magnuson introduced the Trade Simplification Bill of 1968.8 Section 4 of the bill
specifically provides that common carriers in different modes of transportation may
enter into agreements among themselves to establish joint rates for the transportation
of goods between the United States and foreign countries. Each carrier would file the
joint-rate tariff with its respective agency, which would still have to approve the rate
charged by one of its carriers. Once the rates have been approved, they would be given
antitrust protection. During Senate hearings on the bill, it received the endorsement
of the various regulatory agencies and departments of government affected by it.9 The
Department of Transportation report expressed the general feeling of the participants
in the hearings by saying:
The so-called "container revolution" was brought about by the development
of new transportation technology and hardware, particularly the container
and the equipment necessary to guarantee an efficient transfer of the container between different modes of transport. Nevertheless, the old transportation environment and indeed the old impediments to transportation still
remain. This bill . . . is designed to eliminate those transportation impediments .. . so that the full opportunities which container technology offers can
be exploited. 10
The bill remained in committee until the end of the Ninetieth Congress. Legislation
of this type-enabling the ocean shipper to quote a joint-rate tariff-is conspicuously
necessary, and there is little doubt that some legislative action, whether on this bill or
another, will be forthcoming in the near future. Legislation is a must if maximum cost
savings from containerization is to be realized.
As to the third question of whether the United States can regulate freight carriers in
foreign countries, the simple answer is no. Section 21 of the Shipping Act 11 authorizes
the FMC to require ocean carriers subject to the act to furnish any "account, record,
rate, or charge, or any memorandum of any facts and transactions appertaining to the
business of such carrier .

. . ."

Its jurisdiction has been interpreted to include water

12
carriers doing business with the United States and domiciled in a foreign country. It
is doubtful, however, that this jurisdiction could be extended to regulate inland carriers. Control of rates could be established through treaties of friendship, commerce
and navigation, which are commonly executed between nations today. 13 Provision has
been made in Section 9 of the Trade Simplification Bill for foreign carriers to participate in the joint rates even though they are not subject to regulation by American
agencies. 14 With joint cooperation on the part of shipping conferences, regulatory

8. S. 3235, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
9. 1968 Hearings, supra note 7.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 26.
Shipping Act of 1916, § 21, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1964).
FMC v. De Smedt, 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
May, supra note 1, at 844.
S. 3235, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1968).
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agencies, Congress and foreign governments, the door-to-door concept can become a
workable reality paving the way to maximum utilization of containers.

Port Equalization
The advent of containerization has caused a problem for many of the comparatively
smaller United States ports. Shipowners no longer wish to have their vessels move up
and down the coastline picking up freight along the way. The new container vessels
are extremely expensive and costly to operate and the owners want to reduce the time
ships spend waiting in a series of ports accumulating a load for an ocean voyage. As a
result, rate equalization practices are becoming more pervasive throughout the industry, causing great concern to the affected ports. Equalization is the absorption by
the carrier of the difference between the shippers' cost of delivery to his nearest port
and the cost of delivery to a requested port. For example, carriers have shippers on the
East Coast send their freight to New York rather than to ports which would have been
the shippers' normal ports, thus causing loss in business to these ports.
To counter such action by the carriers, complaints were filed with the FMC by the
Massachusetts Port Authorityls and the Delaware River Port Authority,1 6 charging
discrimination in violation of Section 16 of the Shipping Act. 17 The complaints were
a reaction to equalization procedures set out in new tariffs filed by several conferences.
Section 16 provides in part that "ri]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier by
water ...[t]o make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, locality, or description of traffic . . .to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." 18 After the filing of the complaints, the conferences withdrew the objectionable tariffs.'9
Had litigation arisen on the issue at this time, however, the outcome may not have
been certain. In Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. United States,20 it was held that an
equalization rate would be discriminatory in violation of Section 16 if it was used to
eliminate a port where adequate service is available. The conferences could have successfully argued that adequate facilities are not available at the Massachusetts and
Delaware ports, but this will not be true in the near future. The fact remains, however,
that even if adequate facilities are available at all ports it will still be uneconomical
for these huge container ships to stop at various ports and pick up cargo.
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Atlantic & Caribbean Line, Inc., 21 the defendant ran
a container service and argued for port equalization because of the economics (he was
losing money by failing to equalize) and lost. He was calling at Jacksonville and
15. Massachusetts Port Auth. v. Container Marine Lines, No. 68-45 (FMC, Nov. 21,

1968).
16. Delaware River Port Auth. v. Container Marine Lines, No. 68-46 (FMC, Nov. 25,

1968).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Shipping Act of 1916, § 16, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1964).
Ibid.
Behind-the-scenes negotiating was in process at the time of this writing.
246 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
9 F.M.C. 338 (1966).
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Miami, Florida and then sailing on to Puerto Rico. He discontinued his service to
Jacksonville and absorbed the cost of the shippers' sending their freight to Miami. The
FMC held:
[The defendant diverted] from the port of Jacksonville traffic which is
naturally tributary to Jacksonville and not tributary to the port of Miami,
and which would normally flow through the port of Jacksonville. The diversion of this traffic is not justified by inadequacy of direct-call service at the
port of Jacksonville .... Thus, the diversion of traffic unduly prefers the port
of Miami and is unjustly prejudicial to the port of Jacksonville, in violation
of section sixteen First of the Shipping Act, 1916.22
This language would seem to be a major stumbling block to the case of carriers when
the various ports have adequate facilities, but with the huge investment carriers have
in containerization today, the economics of the situation will inevitably yield a flexible
rule. Language similar to that used in cases to justify equalization will probably be
employed, to the effect that "the public interest is much larger than the needs or desires in [a single port] area. The equalization under consideration here reflects an
overall economic good, tangible benefit to the public at large, and an important transportation justification." 23 (Emphasis added.) The smaller ports may be used to handle
the overflow from the larger, more accessible ports; to serve smaller container ships as
feeders to the main ports; and to handle the non-container traffic. It seems inevitable,
however, that the spiralling success of the container will lead to the complete failure
and closing of some ports. As is often the case, progress is unkind.
Longshoremen and the Container
Just as the need for smaller ports is being eliminated, so is the need for longshoremen.
The main issue in the recent International Longshoreman Association (ILA) strike was
containerization. As noted earlier, great savings are achieved by reducing the number
of times cargo is handled. This reduction in handling threatens the jobs of longshoremen. The conventional method of getting cargo on board a ship has been for the
shipper to send his freight to the port terminal where it was unloaded; then, when the
carrier was ready, the goods were moved to the pier, loaded, and secured on the ship
in a safe manner to prevent damage during the voyage. All of this activity took time
and men, but with the use of containers and container consolidation stations located
outside port terminals, much of the ILA time and labor is eliminated. The big advantage of the consolidation stations is that non-ILA labor, which is considerably cheaper,
is used. It is important for the union to build up man-hours worked because employer
contributions to welfare, sick, pension and vacation plans are based on man-hours.
The three-year contract agreement reached in the Port of New York has a container

22. Id. at 347.
23. Stockton Port Dist. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 9 F.M.C. 12, 28 (1965).
Equalization was allowed because the goods were found to be tributary to more than
one port.
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clause which is a model for all other ports, and goes a long way towards solving this
problem. It provides that ILA labor shall have the right to strip and reload all containers of shipments generated within fifty miles of a port and consolidated by nonILA labor.2 4 The union here has attempted to solve the problem by featherbedding of
a type allowed by the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides: "[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of
value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be
performed. ' ' 25 This provision has been narrowly construed by the courts. If the work
is actually done, there can be no conflict with the statute, regardless of whether the employer wants or needs the work, and regardless of how unrelated the work result may
26
be to the employer's business.
This container clause is satisfactory for New York but not for most of the smaller
ports. Ports such as New York, which are large, centrally located and easily accessible,
are going to have all the work for longshoremen that they can handle. Ports which do
not have the physical advantage of places like New York would like to retain some
economic advantage to entice container carriers to call on them. These ports would
prefer a five or ten mile limit reflected in the container clause to enable them to take
advantage of the cheaper labor to lower carrier costs. Such an agreement, or one
containing lower wages, lower guaranteed annual hours or lower employer contributions to employee benefit plans, probably would be acceptable to the ports. But the
ILA locals were holding out for agreements like the one reached in New York. Even
when a settlement was reached with a particular local, it refused to ratify the settlement and resume work until all locals had settled. This unified position had overtones
27
of an unfair labor practice (failure to bargain in good faith) and was not maintained.
Various locals returned to work, the settlements varying as to guaranteed hours,
salary and employer contributions to benefit plans; but most contained the fifty mile
container limit. The fact that the government could have ordered resumption of work
if the strike appeared to be detrimental to national interests28 was no doubt also in the
minds of labor negotiators. No matter what type of settlements were ultimately made,
the negotiating will begin again in three years with containerization even more firmly
entrenched. 2 9 ILA president Thomas Gleason has taken a tough position and will have

24. Journal of Commerce, January 29, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
25. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 8(b) (6), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (6)
(1964).

26. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); accord,
NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953).
27. To the extent that it is an unfair labor practice to require all ports to settle before any work is resumed at any port see International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB,
277 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d
278 (2d Cir. 1957).
28. See United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
29. By 1970, 80 to 85 percent of the cargo will be moving in intermodal containers.
Hearings on S. 3235, supra note 7, at 26.
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to continue to do so in the future to preserve the jobs and incomes of the union mem30
bership.
The necessary adjustments in the present methods of international trade operation
will be made to accommodate this new system. It is unfortunate that the loss of jobs
and property is the price often paid for progress. But the gain in the form of cheaper,
safer and faster transportation of goods more than offsets these losses, and demands
the use of containers in the future.

30. "Port labor is determined not to be boxed in by the container . .

.

. The ILA . ..

intends to see to it that, containers or no containers, the traditional work of the dock
worker shall not be taken from him. And, furthermore, that he will have employment
in all new work categories which substitute for his traditional functions." Address by
Thomas Gleason, Baltimore Symposium on International Shipping, 1968, in CONTAINER
NEWS, Dec. 1968, at 14.

United MedicalLaboratoriesand Public Concern:
A Judicial Mandate for Unlimited Extension of
the Actual Malice Standard
Five years ago in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1 the Supreme Court determined the
extent to which the first amendment limits a state's power to award damages in a libel
action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. The Court held
that public officials can recover only if "the statement was made with 'actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
'2
false or not."
The decision brought praise from civil libertarians, while skeptics cautioned that the
holding would bring chaos and unpredictability to common law libel standards. One
constitutional expert, Professor Harry Kalven, reasoned: "[The Court] may regard
the [New York Times] opinion as covering simply one pocket of cases, those dealing
with libel of public officials, and not destructive of the earlier notions that are inconsistent only with the larger reading of the Court's action. But the invitation to follow a
dialectic progression from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain, like art, seems to me to be overwhelming."' 3 Professor
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 279-80.
3. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 221. Even if the "invitation to follow a dialectic
progression" from "public official" to related areas was not followed, the extent of the
"public official" class was shown to be practically unlimited in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966). There the Court felt the status of public official would apply even to a
ski lodge superintendent employed by the state.

